The object of this paper is to investigate the view entertained by Z e 11 e r , 1 ) with the support of many other critics and historians, that the Megarians held a theory of εϊδη closely resembling that of Plato. The evidence for this view is entirely indirect. Nowhere in the ancient authorities is such a doctrine attributed to them by name. Stilpo is said to have attacked the είδη of the Academy (Diog. Laert. ii. 119); even though he seems to have incorporated much of the Cynic doctrine in his teaching, so great a change from the supposed earlier attitude of the school is difficult to believe; the suggestion of Z e 11 e r 2 ) that our authority interprets as an argument against the Ideas one that was intended to support them only weakens his case. In fact, Z e 11 e r has no evidence at all except the passage in the Sophist which gives an account of the eldaiv φίλοι (246B ff.), whom Z ell er identifies with the Megarians. The "friends of the Ideas" must stand for some contemporary school or allied schools; in many details their doctrines agree with what is elsewhere known of Megarian theory; the complete opposition between unchangeable noetic reality and the changing corporeal world, treated as an illusion; the Eleatic doctrine of the complete mutual exclusion of Being and Not-being; the denial of δνναμις -all these points, as Ζ ell er urges with force, bear out what is known from other sources of the Megarian doctrines. In one point, however, the theory of the.fMwy φίλοι seems to disagree with Megarianism as otherwise known; it apparently allows a plurality of reals, whereas we have some autho-*) Zeller, Phil. d. Griech. in the English translation "Socrates and the Socratic Schools", pp. 260 ff.
rity for the fact that the Megarians taught the absolute unity of ultimate Being. (Aristocles ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. xiv. 17, p. 756; DL ii. 106) . Zeller meets this difficulty by the hypothesis that in the Sophist we have an earlier form of the Megarian doctrine, in which a partial plurality of reals was recognised. He supposes that the Megarians were led to posit the reality of "intelligible species" by considerations similar to those which influenced Plato, but that afterwards Eleatic influence made them deny reality to all but the supreme είδος. As Apelt points out (Beitr ge zur Gesch, der Gr. Phil. 96), this implies a view as to the relations between the Socratic and the Eleatic elements in Megarianism which requires examination. Apelt suggests that the criticism in Plato's Farmen-ides led the Megarians to substitute for the one ultimate είδος the many εϊόη of the S o p h i s t. This only makes the difficulty of reconciling the theory with the late evidence twice as great as before; for this evidence, though it may be consistent with an early and transitional form of Megarianism, which allowed a plurality of reals, utterly precludes the possibility of such a doctrine being* a permanent element in the Megarian metaphysic.
The points which require investigation are easily stated. We must first of all examine the internal evidence of the passage in the S o p h i s t. We must then inquire whether the metaphysic and logic of the Megarians. as known to us from independent sources, are so closely akin to the Platonic as demanded by Z eller's theory. We shall find their spirit, their aims, their presuppositions so opposed to the Platonic in fundamental respects, that we cannot seriously entertain the view that Megarianism and Platonism travelled on the same road for a time, and subsequently diverged in opposite directions.
First, then, for the tld&v φίλοι. If it could be proved that by them Plato does not mean the Megarians at all, but either an earlier form of his own doctrines (Jackson) or a misapprehension of his views by younger members of the Academy, then the case for a Megarian theory of semi-Platonic είδη w r ould disappear for total absence of evidence. I do not think that either of these interpretations can be established. Jackson's account of the development of the Platonic theory seems to me mistaken; but even if it were correct, even if Plato does allude to his own earlier doctrines or to variations in the Academy, there is not evidence enough to preclude the possibility that he has in mind the Megarians as well. The doctrine of the εϊδων φίλοι contains elements which were certainly common to both Megarianism and Platonism. Both schools could be described as engaged in a great struggle with materialism. Both placed reality in the region of the noetic. Some phrases are indeed more apposite if taken as allusions to Megarian theory: χατά σμιχρά όιαΰραιοντες ίν τοις λόγοις (246 Β) applies better to the Megarian arguments against motion (Sext. Emp. adv. Math. x. 85 if.) than to anything in the Platonic theory; the same may be said of the denial of δνναμις as having ultimate reality (248 C).
On the other hand it cannot be proved that Plato means only the Megarians. without any reference whatsoever to his own doctrines.
3 ) The doctrines attributed to the εΐόών φίλοι are not introduced merely as a bit of history but as a subject of criticism. The criticism may be thus expressed: if you deny all change, all activity, all causality of the ultimately real, then reality and experience cannot be reconciled. But this "is precisely the tendency of those who teach the incorporeality of the real. So far as we kno\v, only the Platonic and the Megarian schools held this doctrine. Hence there is prima facie evidence that Plato means both. And the criticism has this topical application: so far as the Megarian denies outright the reality of all activity, and so far as a Platonist tends to exaggerate the immobility of ultimate Being, each comes under censure. Plato's contemporary readers would judge for themselves how well the cap fitted each.
But if we hold that the Megarians are included under the ειδών φίλοι, must we not also hold that they taught the existence of είδη in the sense of "intelligible species ?" It has always been regarded as characteristic of the Platonic είδος that in it for the first time the reality of the universal as such is recognised; Ζ ell er attributes the same conception to the Megarians.. Now I cannot see any evidence for this in the late authorities, and I do not think that, 3 ) Ritter has recently pointed out a phrase in the account of the "friends of the Forms" which seems to refer to a distinctively Platonic doctrine, viz: 248 Α γίν^βιν, την ίε ονβίαν χωρίς πον διελόμενοι λέ/ετξ ... xal σώματι μεν ημάς yevfafl· OS αΙβ3Ί\6ξως χοινωνεΐν, δια λογιομον όε -ψυχτι προς την όντως ουσίαν. C. Ritter, Neue Untersuchungen ber Platon, p. 31. when properly considered, the application to them of the name "friends of the είδη" carries with it this implication. Only the Good is real, said the Megarians: but the Megarian Good is not an stdog in any Platonic sense. The one ultimate Being of the Megarians was apparently conceived as a unique individual substance; it admitted a certain limited plurality, for it was known under more than one name.
4 ) The Megarian attitude towards sense-experience is thoroughly Eleatic; if there were -no suggestion that the doctrine of είδη formed part of their system, we should undoubtedly be justified in attributing to them a thoroughly Eleatic conception of Being. The Eleatic Being is a unique substance having as its formal characters unity, immutability and completeness, and as its material essence corporeality; the Megarian Being seems to have differed only in substituting goodness for the corporeality. I take it that the Megarian Being was a Reason which contemplated continuously its own complete immutable perfection; a νονς intuiting itself, as on the theological theory of Aristotle, without the causal connexion with the empirical world. If we examine the impassioned appeal in which Plato pleads for allowing life and activity to the ultimate Being in Sophist 248 D ff., we see that he seems to have in view a "doctrine that the ultimate Being is a unique being which has absolute existence and absolute knowledge, but whose knowledge is denied to involve any activity (ποιεΐν), because activity implies change. If Being is one, complete and unchanged, and if knowledge is defined as knowledge of absolute Being, and means that the subject in knowledge is in complete unity with its object, then the conclusion follows that all activity is excluded from the knowing subject, Plato seems to be arguing that if you admit reason in the ultimate Being, then you must admit activity, the essential character of Reason; if not, then your absolute is a lifeless statue of the Deity, not the Deity himself. Thus the internal evidence of the passage in the Sophist seems to show that the doctrine of the εϊόων φίλοι posits a unique substantial Being, with the formal characters of Eleatic being, and which is at once the subject and the object of absolute knowledge. The Parmenides bears out this interpretation. In the earlier part there can be no doubt that Plato is reviewing his own doctrine of the Ideas.
5
) His aim in so doing agrees with the view that under the είδαν φίλοι he includes both the Megarians and his own followers. He shows that if the immutable and substantial nature of the Ideas is exaggerated, then the cleft between absolute knowledge and our knowledge becomes just as impassable as on the Megarian theory that there is no mean between Being and Not-being, and therefore no mean between Knowledge and Ignorance. The second part deals with another side of the problem how unity and diversity are to be reconciled; here the One is not the Idea opposed to the plurality of its manifestations, but the Absolute. 6 ) Both thesis and antithesis posit an Absolute with certain determinate characters. Plato shows that if the Absolute is conceived as a unity which completely excludes plurality, then it is necessarily out of all relation to the world of experience, whereas if it is conceived as one and yet various, it can be thought as including within itself the world of experience. The critique would be more pointed if we could suppose that it is directed not merely against the Eleatics but rather against some contemporaries of Plato. And the role of Parmenides in the dialogue is easily intelligible as that of the master showing how his own principle of the unity of Being must be interpreted in the light of contemporary speculation.
But, it may be asked, if the Megarian Being is to be regarded as an Eleatic substance with goodness and thought as its essential attributes, if the Megarian Good is not the principle of goodness, like the Platonic Ιδέα του dyauov, but a g o o d being, could the Megarians be regarded as "friends of the «icty" ? Now it must be noted that not a word is said in the Sophist to show that the noetic Being of the εϊδ&ν φίλοι is in any sense a u n i v e r s a 1; the features of this Being that are subjected to criticism are those of immutability and inactivity. It is expressly said that the criticisms apply equally, wheter the ultimate is regarded as one or as many (249 C). Z e 11 e r' s view that Plato has in mind a doctrine of a plurality of Forms which must, as a result of his criticism, be regarded as living forces, has no support in the language of the Sophist. The παντελώς υ ν which in 248 E ff. is stated to have life and thought must be a unique individual being, the All. But I see nothing to prevent Plato from applying the term "friends of the Forms" to thinkers who did not recognise the reality of the universal in the same manner as he did himself. I hold Natorp's view that the Idea of Plato is less a substance than a methodological conception. Now one of the fundamental distinctions in the doctrine of Ideas or Forms is that between accidental and contingent predication and essential and invariable predication. Beauty is accidentally predicated of the beautiful thing, but predicated essentially of beauty itself. You can only predicate beauty with metaphysical certainty of that which is in its own nature and being beautiful. Now the Megarian method seems to have been the same; you can only predicate being of that which in its own nature has all the indispensable features of being. This is the method ίν τοις λόγοις of P h a e d ο 99 Ε. Only that which is in itself one, in itself immutable, in itself complete, in itself good can be real. The characters of unity and completeness are so interpreted as to preclude the possibility of there being more than one thing with the requisite characters. If the είδη are primarily methodological, Plato might easily apply the name ειδών qilot, to •others, whose logical method, viz: the use of conceptual determination, agreed closely with his own, even if their metaphysical assumptions and conclusions in many respects differed from his own.
I have supposed that Plato is here using the term είδη in his own technical sense, and that the side of the conception that is here prominent is the idea of essential as opposed to accidental predication. I see no reason to believe* that the Megarians used the term εϊόη themselves·; on the contrary, I believe that the use of the term in a technical metaphysical sense arose in the Academy. The Aristotelian •evidence has usually been held to support this view. .But Prof. B u r n e t 7 ) has recently advanced the hypothesis that είδος in the sense of a metaphysical Form was of more general use. He argues that it was used in this special sense by late Pythagoreans (apparently under the influence of Socrates), and from them derived by Plato and others, including the Megarians. His evidence appears to me quite inconclusive. His argument that because the Pythagoreans, Simmias and Cebes, are made to accept the εϊόη as familiar in P h a e d ο 76 D, it is a Pythagorean doctrine, is extraordinarily weak. If Simmias and Cebes are to be taken as representatives of Pythagorean doctrine, surely it is what they advance themselves and not what they accept from Socrates that is to be regarded as Pythagorean. If they are also Socratics, they may be regarded with as much reason as accepting qua Socratics. Prof. H a r n a c k 8 ) has recently taken the critics to task for forgetting that the Acts of the Apostles is a literary work, to be judged by literary standards, and to be understood only by considering how a literary man of the period would set about his task. Of all writers none was more careful than Plato to carry out the principles of the literary form which he adopted. If Socrates in the P h a e d ο describes in detail the doctrine of Reminiscence, whereas he. assumes the general theory of Ideas, may the reason not be the simple one that for some purpose of his own Plato desired to give an account of the one and not of the other? In the dialogue form this is naturally translated into the form of ignorance of the one doctrine and previous knowledge of the other on the part of Socrates' interlocutor. Prof. B u r n e t' s triumphant query, whether any philosopher ever represented a theory of his own as one familiar to his contemporaries, has no real point. We might counter with the query whether any philosopher ever represented his own theories as being known to, and propounded by his master. Yet, unless we are to revise all our ideas of the relation between Socrates and Plato, this is precisely what Plato did. Here Prof. T ay lor is consistent: he follows up Prof. Bur net's "proof" by virtually attributing to the historical Socrates every thing that the Platonic Socrates says. 9 ) Prof. B u r n e t lays stress on the facts that Aristotle does not explicitly assign the doctrine of εϊόη to Plato only, and that he treats the Platonic μέΰβξις as merely a variant of the Pythagorean μίμησις. But can any reader of the first book of the Metaphysics have any doubt that Aristotle regards the theory of the εϊόη as exclusively Platonic ? He never calls the Numbers of the Pythagoreans εϊό·η, and seems careful throughout to distinguish them from the Platonic Ideas and Ideal numbers. Metaph. 990 a 33 draws as formal a distinction as possible between the Pythagoreans and the supporters of the Ideas; the είδη which Simmias and Cebes accept in Phaedo 76D presuppose the dialectic which Aristotle (Metaph. 987 b 31) asserts, in complete agreement with the Socrates of the P h a e d o 99 E, to have motived the theory of the Ideas; Aristotle's words 1. c. show that he contrasts Pythagoreanism with this theory. The passage in which Aristotle compares the Platonic μέ&εξι,ς with the Pythagorean μίμηΰΐς (987 b 10) does not state that the Pythagorean Numbers are είδη^ and is followed shortly by the passage cited above (987 b 31) which contrasts these numbers with the Ideas. Thus the supposed evidence for a widespread theory of Forms disappears; and it seems that we should be bound to regard such Forms as essentially substantive, so that if the substantive nature of the Platonic Form is exaggerated by Aristotle, there is the less intrinsic reason for supposing that a doctrine of Forms was so widely held as Burnet argues.
Z e 11 e r' s account of the development of the Megarian metaphysic may be thus summarised. The Megarians, like Plato, start from the Socratic demand for definitions. Under the influence of Eleaticism, both hold that "only the permanent element in things is real"; the permanent element they find in the concept or ''intelligible species". This they hypostatise into a kind of thing or substance. At this point there arises a divergence of view; the problem being raised how the unity of the concept can be reconciled with the plurality of experience, Plato attempts to solve it in such a way as to assure the possibility of knowledge, while the Megarians, influenced more and more by Eleatic dogmas, regard it as insoluble and ultimately deny even the plurality of concepts. It will be observed that this account rests entirely on the supposed identity of the sld&v φίλοι with the Megarians, to whom accordingly Ζ e 11 e r assigns the Platonic conception of the Idea as he understands it. Hence, if, his view of the development of Platonism is incorrect, his account of Megarianism is vitiated; if, again, it can be shown that the principles which guided Plato are in distinct opposition to the principles on which the fully developed Megarianism rested, Zeller' s account has no basis at all.
It appears to me that the treatment of Socrates and his influence on the theory of knowledge by Z e 11 e r and most modern critics 226* C. M. Gillespie, is vitiated by a Kantian subjectivism. The Begriff (concept) of these critics stands now for an object which exists for a thinking consciousness, now for the thought itself. Now it is quite true that for Plato only the conceptual view of things can reach ultimate reality: the treatment of the Ideas as numbers evidently is motived by the desire to eliminate all imaginative elements from them. It cannot be denied that in Plato the distinction between Begriff and Vorstellung is clear and vital. It is for Plato one aspect of the distinction between scientific and empirical knowledge common to all the Socratic schools, and directly due to the Socratic definition. But it would be a mistake to regard this aspect of the distinction as the pivot on which discussion turned among the followers of Socrates. The epistemological questions raised by Socrates and subjected to regular discussion by his successors were raised in a thoroughly realistic form. The Begriff of the modern commentator covers sometimes ουσία or πράγμα, sometimes λόγος, which the Greeks kept distinct. The realistic attitude is well shown in the Greek terms used in the theory of definition. A modern writer would probably think of definition as a process which makes your ideas clear and distinct. Logically, it would be regarded as determining the meaning of a term; this would be further explained as analysing the concept which the term expresses; thus, to use Meinong's distinction, 10 ) in defining a term you give at once the objective significance (Bedeutung) and express the existence of an idea or concept in a mind (Ausdruck). Methodologically, definition would be connected with the requirement which makes definition a preliminary to syllogistic argument, as a necessary condition of exact thought. Now the inquiry into the τί son, was first expressly and systematically carried on by Socrates. But for Socrates and his successors definition was no preliminary process of fixing terms; it was the goal of method; the inquiry into the τί εστί supplied the major premisses of knowledge; after the τί εστίν is determined nothing remains but the application of knowledge. For Socrates definition does not primarily answer the question τί σημαίνει το όνομα, but the question τί εστί το πράγμα. In Aristotle, with the development of syllogistic doctrine and the distinction between the formal and scientific use of syllogism, we find nominal°) Meinong, Annahmen', and real definition marked off from one another: but his doctrine that the middle term in demonstration must be the cause, and ultimately the formal cause, shows that the determination of the τί εστίν is the key to knowledge. Prior to Aristotle the question τί εστί means always "what is the ουσία of A?", never u what is the intension of the term A?" or u what is the content of the concept A?" A formula (λύγος) has to be found which shall express the real nature of A.
Let us follow out some of the implications of this way of proceeding. It implies, in the first place, that the πράγμα to be defined has some kind of empirical existence. In dialectical inquiry (and we must remember that the early logic is dialectics) both disputants agree upon the existence of the νποχείμενον to be defined.
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) It implies, secondly, that there is some difference of opinion or doubt or confusion of ideas in the minds of the disputants. But the cause of this and the means of removing it are conceived realistically. The clearness of ideas necessary to a final agreement between the disputants means apprehending the essence of the thing. Now if the question is put in this form, a distinction is implied which is not so prominent if definition is looked on as determining a "concept". For essence involves an opposition between the inalienable inner nature of the object on the one hand and its passing states, transient relations and illusory appearances on the other. Logically, it contains the distinction between essential and accidental predication as Aristotle expresses it. But it is primarily an extra-logical conception, concerned rather with the real conditions of predication than with predication itself. Plato in his classificatory scheme of science sought to give it logical precision^ and Aristotle went a step further in the doctrine of the categories, with its rejection of all μετάβασης είς αλλο γέρος in definition. Thus in Aristotle essence approximates to "concept", though it is always more> as being the cause. But logic was not developed in Greece as an independent discipline; Plato, and Aristotle's treatment of definition and essence show the effort to disentangle the web of logical and extra-logical elements in the earlier views on the subject. The difficulty found by earlier thought in the "is" of the copula exhibits a struggle between the logical effort ") See G o r g i a s 454 C al. to reduce all predication to a single form and the metaphysical implications of the concept of being. To a follower of Socrates the question τί Ιοτιν always meant "What is the thing really?"; the question could only be answered by a critical examination of ideas, by the method εν τοις λόγοις^ but the answer differed according to the view adopted as to the general nature of reality. When Antisthenes put the question, "What are wealth and poverty, what is justice?" he did not ask for a formal or technical definition of these terms: what he did ask was this "Are these things real conditions of all human activity, based upon fundamental natural characters of man. or are they rather artificial products of our imagination? " To a mind saturated with Eleatic theory, as we must suppose Euclides to have been, the ontological applications of the Socratic question must have seemed the most interesting and important: it would mean to him, in consequence of the absolute division between reality and appearance with which he started, "Is S real or merely appearance?"
Bearing in mind, then, that the Socratic τί έβτι,ν did not mean to his followers primarily the determination of "concepts", but the determination of the real nature of things (φνΜς> ονοία) and its expression in a λόγος, let us examine what is known of the Megarian theories.
The central Megarian απορία is the difficulty of reconciling unity with plurality. This problem assumes various forms in the history of Greek thought. It appears first in the Eleatic contrast between the unity of absolute being and the plurality of experience, especially as shown in the fact of change. Prominent in the thought of Plato is the problem of reconciling the unity of the universal predicate with the plurality of its subjects; the problem of predication, as Gomperz calls it.
12 ) It appears again as the difficulty of grasping the identity of the individual through its changing states, a difficulty which sometimes takes the wider form of grasping the unity of the subject amid the plurality of its determinations, Gomperz' problem of inherence. We shall see that the first and third of these anoQiai were undoubtedly developed by the Megarians; but if they held a doctrine of εϊόη in the sense in which it is attributed to them by Zeller, it is the second that is the most important, .and this is raised in a special form, asserting the reality of the universal "concept" as against the many of experience. Now it will be noticed that the first and third of the problems concern the existence of the concrete individual, and do not in the least imply the reality of the universal as such. As far as I can see, there is no reason whatever for attributing to the Megarians any doctrine that the universal as such is alone real. Z e 11 e r' s account runs thus. Plato and the Megarians, following out the Eleatic conception that Being is permanent, found that though the objects ol experience are transitory and changeable, they contain a permanent element, the universal predicates, which are apprehended by reason. Hence the universal as such is real. But while this view agreed witb the Parmenidean criticism as regards the permanency of the real, it left over the difficulty how the unity of the universal can be reconciled with the plurality of its manifestations. This difficulty the Megarians could not solve, so that the world of reality and the world of appearance fell apart into two unrelated systems; and furthei criticism sho\ved that the plurality of είδη was inconsistent with the unity of Being, so that ultimately only the supreme είδος oJ Being is real.
13
) Plato, on the other hand, tried to solve the difficulty and his solution is to be found in the κοινωνία των γενών of the S o p h i s t.
This account seems to me to be radically unsound. To begin with, it is not the case that the Platonic είδος was ever regarded as a unity which excluded plurality. 14 ) From the very first the είδος is unity in plurality. In Symposium 21 IB Plato is careful to insist that the unity of the one Idea is not disturbed by the plurality of its manifestations. But the account of the αντό χερκίς in C r atylus 389 B shows the other aspect; it is of the very essence of the είοος to manifest its unity in the diversity of its application. This point is just as clear as in the κοινωνία των γενών of the Sophist. From the very first the Platonic theory of είδη implies a denial of the 'Eleatic doctrine that unity and plurality completely exclude each other, although it is in the later dialogues that Plato addresses himself to the explicit justification of his view on this point.
) Cf. D ring, Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, I. 511-12. 14 ) Cf. Stewart, Plato's Theory of Ideas, pp. 6 ff. Now the motives which led Plato to this doctrine of the the universal scheme or plan, realised in diverse forms, seem to have been in thoroughgoing opposition to the fundamental principles of Megarian thought. In the P a r m e n i d e s , after the difficulties attending the relations between Idea and particular have been stated, it is explicitly said that if they are not to be solved, knowledge becomes impossible (135 B). But Plato insists that knowledge is possible. Now by this he does not mean that such knowledge is of an object totally disconnected with experience. He means that every part of experience is connected together in one system of reality. Every bit of experience implies an είδος. This is plainly implied in the classification of είδη in P a r m e n i d e s 130 B ff. The arguments alluded to by Aristotle (Metaph. 990 b 10 ff.) as proving too much have the same implication, that all matter of experience is matter of scientific knowledge. The same inference may be drawn from the account of the method ει> τοις λόγοις of the P h a e d o. Plato, it is true, constantly contrasts the obscurity and contradiction of experience with the clearness of pure thought, but he never treats experience as mere illusion. The continuity of popular and scientific thought is a marked feature in the Division ef the Line.
15
) Already in the Eepublic the object of όόξα is allowed a certain position in reality; it is distinguished from Not-being, under which we are told that the Megarians reckoned everything other than the one fundamental Being.
16
) Thus the Platonic doctrine that the universal sMoc is real is a mediating doctrine, aiming at a reconciliation between the ultimate unity of the real and the plurality of experience, and it is hard to see with what other object it could have been developed. But there is no evidence that the Megarians had any such aim; on the contrary, mediation and reconciliation of opposites seem far removed from their way of thought. This was just as extreme, just as abstractly critical as the Parmenidean. For them, experience and reality fall apart completely; for Plato, experience organised and systematised as knowledge comes into contact with true Being. But if this account is correct, that Plato's recognition of the universal as 15 ) Cf. Taylor, Mind, N. S., vol. V, p. 506.
) Diog. Laert. ii. 106. real (which Aristotle certainly held to be a doctrine peculiar to the Academy) was due to his desire to reconcile experience and reality, we should expect to find that the Megarians held the unique individual nature of reality. Now not only is this conclusion in agreement with what we are told of the Megarian ontology, but if the Megarians proceeded directly from Eleatic premisses, they must have held this view. Let us try to get some idea of the way in which the Socratic teaching would influence one who was strongly imbued with Eleatic ideas. Now it seems certain that the Megarians were primarily interested in metaphysics and dialectic, and only secondarily in ethics. Their ethical teaching seems to have been comprised in an attitude of άπά&εια towards experience, with an extreme adherence to the superiority of the speculative life. They seem to have fully adopted the Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge, and to have identified knowledge with metaphysical consistency. Hence we may suppose that their chief interest in the Socratic teaching was directed towards his development of dialectic, and that they applied it to their metaphysic.
Here we must remark on the fact that the method of Parmenides himself was really a method ev τοις λόγοις with a close affinity to the Socratic method of definition. Parmenides had investigated the conception of Being: he had laid down certain characters as the inalienable predicates of Being-unity, immutability, completeness, corporeality-and worked out a system of reality which was in absolute contradiction with experience. Zeno had shown that if space and time are treated as a plurality of discretes they give rise to inevitable contradictions. To an Eleatic, interested primarily in absolute being, the primary application of the Socratic question would be "What is Being?" It would mean for him that the inquiry into the essential characters of Being must be carried on in the spirit of the strictest dialectical criticism. Now within the Eleatic circle certain antinomies had already arisen. Parmenides had taught the finitude of Being, Melissus its infinite extension in space. Whatever may have been Zeno's object in his attacks on motion, their result was to show that space is both one and many. The Megarians seem to have argued that as the spatial and corporeal predicates of the Eleatic Being contain a fundamental contradiction, they cannot be attributes of true Being. Being is incorporeal. But if so, some positive characters must be found for it; the Absolute cannot be a zero. Its formal characters remain the same, unity, immutabihty, completeness; but these formal characters must be derived. We must ask what is the positive nature of that which by its own specific constitution cannot change, cannot admit diversity, cannot fail of completeness. The answer given by the Megarians to this question seems to have been the Good. \Ve may suppose them to have derived the unchangeability of the Good by some such argument as that used in R e p u b l i c 380 D, that any change would be towards a worse. Its unity might follow from the absence of degree in absolute good, its completeness from some such considerations as those which determine the conception of the chief good in Plato and Aristotle. These developments, be it noted, carry yet further the separation of reality and experience taught by Parmenides, who at least allowed the corporeality of true Being.
If this account of the relation of Megarianism to Eleaticism is correct, then the Megarian Absolute is conceived asasubstance, a unique permanent being with inalienable attributes, and everything which lacks these attributes falls into the category of Not-being, and becomes mere illusion. The Megarian critique of experience is merely the demonstration that no object of experience fulfils the conditions laid down. The objects of experience present themselves as αϊύ&ηταΐ ovcsicu, concrete objects of which various determinations can be predicated. But on examination it is found that these predicates are indeterminate; they do not exclude one another; they are abstractions w r hich upon criticism turn out to contain an infinite variation and plurality; they are self-contradictory, and therefore unreal. Here the Megarians must have been in direct opposition to Plato: Plato holds that there is indeed inconsistency in experience, but argues that if the predicates are taken by themselves apart from their applications, this inconsistency disappears; the beautiful is always beautiful: the Megarians insisted that the predicates themselves contain inner inconsistencies. But if so, the Megarian εϊόη must disappear into the realm of pure fiction. I shall show that the Megarian logic (or eristic) tries to prove the indeterminateness of all predicates save those of the ultimate Being. Again, if you examine the subjects, the concrete νποχβίμενα of these attributes, they also break up into an infinity of transient things, with no permanent and essential determinations whatever. From whichever side you take experience, it lacks every one of the attributes which pure reason determines to be the necessary attributes of Being.
Such a theory, indeed, establishes one supreme immutable substance, to which the words in S o p h i s t 248 E "well apply, but it virtually denies all substantiality to the world of sense-experience, which becomes a mere flux of illusory phenomena, having no assignable connexion with reality. It appears to have been the direct aim of the eristic logic of the Megarians to emphasise to the uttermost this feature of all empirical objects. Prantl in his account of the Megarian logic (Geschichte der Logik, i. 33 ff.) draws freely upon the eristic fallacies cited in the Euthydemus and the Sophistic! Elenchi. In this I believe him to be fully justified. But it is unnecessary to follow him in his view that the Megarians derived their eristic methods from the "sophists" (p. 33). Joel has show 7 n 17 ) that the eristic "sophists" are the Megarians and the Cynics. If we compare the Protagoras with the Euthydemus and the Sophist, we see that the sophists of the latter works are not the older teachers of civic virtues but rather pseudophilosophers, whose aim is the development of the individual and whose method is dialectic, modelled more on the Socratic than on the Zenonian lines. The Megarians are regarded by the later tradition as the eristics par excellence, and the fallacies attributed to them by this tradition are to be found in the work of Aristotle, together with many others of kindred import.
It is less difficult than has been sometimes supposed to find a purpose underlying such of the fallacies "of the sophists" as are not purely verbal. Predication means asserting some general idea of some subject or νποχεψζνον. True predication means asserting a determinate idea of a permanent determinate subject, which necessarily has the character connoted by the predicate. The aim of the Megarian dialectic is to show that no such determinate predicate and no such permanent subject can be found in experience.
Under the first head, the indeterminateness of predicates, come σωρείτης and φαλακρός (D. L. ii. 108), the point of which is simply to show that in these cases no clear line can be drawn between P and not-P, so that the principle of contradiction does not hold.
)
The sophistries about the predication of πατήρ and ίμός in E u t h y d e m u s 297 D, 302 A are to be classified under this head. They are not, at least directly, connected with the difficulty how a thing can b e in any sense other than itself. Nor are they simply due to inability to understand relations. The point at issue is this: if a relative term is applied to a particular object, it implies a relation to some particular object. Thus the relative term raises in a specially acute form the difficulty how the unity of the general concept can be preserved in its application to particular cases; it is Gomperz' "problem of predication". Metaphysically the απορία involves the doctrine of the particularisation of relations; this point is clear in the argument about "mine", which seeks to show by a reductio ad absurdum that the relation between myself and mine varies according to the nature of the object called mine. This fallacy is cited by Aristotle as a variety of Accidens (S. E. 179 b 3). Another variety of Accidens seems to have the same bearing. If Coriscus is different from Socrates, and Socrates is a man, Coriscus is different from man, and therefore not a man. (S. E. 166 b 34). Comparing Simplicius, Phys. 120, 13 D, we see that different (έτερον) means λόγω έτερον. The point seems to be that the manhood of Coriscus and of Socrates are different, 19 ) so that the single idea of manhood becomes broken up among the infinity of individual men. This being so, all empirical reasoning about men becomes at best a kind of analogy, in which no determinate universal can be found to supply a proper major premiss. Eeasoning about the objects of experience falls under the censure which we are told was passed by Euclides on the Socratic method of analogy (D. L. ii. 107). The Platonic ideal of a scientific knowledge which deals with things through their εϊόη alone (Republic 511 B) is an empty dream. When Simplicius attributes to the ) Contrast Plato's solution of the apparent contradiction in calling the same finger both great and small in Republic VII, 523 Off. Sorites seems to deny that "greatness" and "smallness' 2 are each "one", because they seem to slide into one another.
19
) Cf. Herbert Spencer, Principles of Psychology, ii. 60. rians the axiom that things of which the λόγοι, are distinct are themselves distinct (Phys. 120. 12 D), he simply means that they argued as formal logicians. Now the fallacies termed Accidens (ΰνμβεβηχός) by Aristotle, most of which are assigned to the Megarians by other authorities, rest on a disregard of essential and unessential predication, a distinction which is ultimately material rather than formal. The object of those who propounded these fallacies is to prove that you cannot dissociate the universal from its particular subject, so that the fixity of the universal required for strict formal reasoning is unobtainable in all matters of experience. The peculiar form of the τρίτος άν&ρωπος attributed by Alexander (Metaph. 84. 7 H) t® certain sophists seems to have touched on this point. What do yoia mean by άν&ρωπος in the sentence άν&ρωπος περιπατεί ? You do not mean this man, Coriscus, with the unique manhood of Coriscus; nor do you mean the relatively abstract manhood of such a proposition as "the Greeks are men"; but a something with the uniqueness of the individual, yet not determinate, as in the case of Socrates or Coriscus.
The second class of fallacies raises the problem of the self-identity of the concrete subject through a process of change. Simplicius, Phys. 120. 13 D, attributes to the Megarians the argument that as the λόγοι of . Σωκράτης λευκός and Σαικράτης μονοικός are distinct, Socrates is distinct from himself. This argument clearly turns on the difficulty of reconciling the plurality of attributes with the unity of the subject, in the special form of the difficulty of the relation between the πά&η and the subject. The argumentjias been generally taken to show that the Megarians agreed with Antisthenes in allowing only identical judgements; I shall return to this point later, and for the present will merely remark that the απορία has a close affinity to the one mentioned by Aristotle (S. E. 175 b 19) how opposite πά&η can be successively predicated of the same subject. He cites a solution which he rejects; it is not the same Coriscus that is unmusical and musical, but this Coriscus is unmusical and this other Coriscus is musical. The solution is based on the principle assigned by Simplicius 1. c. to the Megarians, viz: ων ol λύγο* έτεροι ίτερά SGTW. It may be noted that two passages in the Euthydemus, whicji have been usually regarded as containing mere verbal quibbles, really imply the s?ime principle. In 293 C Euthydemus argues that a subject cannot be both επιστήμων and άνεπιβτήμων, because, if so, be both is and is not υς εοτιν. So in 283 CD Dionysodorus tells Ctesippus that if he desires Clinias, who is not wise, to become wise, he desires him to become ος ουκ εβτιν, i. .e. to perish. I cannot think that this is merely a fallacy in dictione, because the use of ος here for οίος must have seemed just as forced to a Greek as it does to us. It must be the application of some theoretical principle. And this principle asserts that the πά&η of a subject must be included in the being of the subject. The full meaning of the απορία is to be reconstructed somewhat as follows. If Socrates is a permanently existing substance, then the λόγος of Socrates must be predicable of him always and in every context. But as a matter of fact Socrates changes; the λόγος of Socrates at any time must include all his nature and his πά&η; as change is continuous the one λόγος of Socrates breaks up into an infinity of λύγοι, each of which has a different content. If we consider the relation of a thing to its πά&η, the u is" predicating whiteness must be limited to the η ο w. Hence this dilemma: either Socrates is or is not identical through his changes; if he is, then the propositions Socrates is ignorant, Socrates is learned, are both true of the same identical subject, which is forbidden by the principle of contradiction; if he is not, then all predication is strictly confined to the now. and as the πάΰος is part of Socrates, "Socrates" becomes a name for a series of successive transient things.
That the Megarians argued somewhat on these lines seems indicated by convergent lines of evidence. We have seen that the fallacy of ανμβεβηκός in the S o p h i s t ic i E l e n c h i is specially associated with certain sophisms attributed by name to the Megarians. This fallacy means neglecting the distinction between essential and unessential predication. Now in the M e t a p h y s d c s Aristotle urges that the denial of the principle of contradiction involves the consequence that all predication is κατά σνμβεβηχύς (1007 a 21). Aristotle's critique is apparently directed against the Hera-elitism of the time, but if my account of the doctrine of the Megarians is correct, they could well be included among those who denied the principle of contradiction, because they did deny it of all permanent αίσ&ηταΐ ονοίαι as understood by the ordinary man.
Another bit of evidence is provided by the well-attested denial of the potential. Eudemus tells us that the eristic άποςίαι about predication were first solved by the Platonic distinction between two senses of the word "being", a distinction which may be identified with that between essential and unessential predication (χα& αντο and χατά ανμβεβηχός: see Eudem. ap. Simplic. Phys. 1. 97. 25 D). Plato's meaning may be thus put in more modern terminology. When we predicate old, wise etc. of Socrates the "is" of grammatical expression marks the relation of the attribute to the subject in which it inheres. But the subject, Socrates or man, is not the object as it presents itself to sense-experience; it is a conceptual system, of which all the attributes form part; the present tense of the copula does not imply a strict time-relation, but the noetic relation of attribute to its subject. Rightly understood, there is no contradiction in predicating both old and young of Socrates, because the idea of the conceptual system "Socrates" necessarily includes both. Eudemus, however, (Simpl. 1. c. 98. 7 D) considers that the Aristotelian distinction of the actual and the potential is necessary for the final solution of the problem. In other words, Socrates is more than a mere conceptual system; he is a real substance existing in space and time; it is truer that we can only grasp what Socrates i s by considering his whole life, but on the other hand we must fully recognise his development in time; the "is" of predication here is not completely timeless; yet we must distinguish between what Socrates is now and what he will or may be in the course of time; hence the fully concrete idea of Socrates involves the conception of potential being. The Megarian opponents of Aristotle seem to have retorted that his conception of the potentially existent involves the inadmissible assertion that a subject may both be and not be the same at the same time. But if my idea of Socrates is not to include anything that is not actual at this time, Socrates is never identical with himself .but is a mere succession of differents, and "is" can only be predicated under the strictest of time-limitations.
Such a resolutian of the permanent substance into what may be called a series of transient substances is in close agreement with the treatment of motion by the Megarians. Analysing the time and space occupied by the movement, the Megarians were, unable to detect motion anywhere; all that analytical thought could descry was a body stationary at a series of points during a series of points of time. Bence Diodorus Cronus demonstrated that nothing moves Archiv f r Geschichte der Philosophie. XXIV. 2. 16 though, in accordance with the empirical hypothesis, it may be said to have moved (Sext. Emp., adv. Math. x. 85). The απορία dates from the Zenonian arguments against motion, and another solution is mooted inParmenides 156 D, where an εξαίφνης, not in time, is posited to get over the difficulty. The sophisms cited by Plato and Aristotle seem to show that the same mode of analysis was applied to the qualitative change of the object. All that could be found was a series of different states of the object: and as the state cannot be separated from the object itself, which is indeed known only through its states, these become, strictly speaking, a succession of different objects. Electra and έγκβχαλνμμένος are attributed by Diogenes (ii. 108) to Eubulides, and are cited by Aristotle (S. E. 179 b 1) as examples of the fallacy of Accident. Hence we have evidence that arguments of this type were used by the Megarians. But the aim of these sophisms seems to be that of showing that a permanent idea of the individual is difficult. Either your idea of the individual contains its accidents or it does not; if it does, it must change as the individual changes, if it does not, you cannot find any positive content *at all If the οιψβεβηχότα can change without destroying the unity of the subject, the subject of these σνμβεβηχότα is permanent. But, urge the Megarians, can we say that wisdom (see Euthydemus 283 C) is not part of the individual so long as he is wise? If it is part, the individual is different as his qualities change; his οισία is different. The idea of Clinias as he is now may be analysed into the general contents abc, which can be described in a λόγος; the idea of Clinias after he has acquired knowledge is analysable into abd; therefore Clinias is. different.
The denial of the possibility of μα&εΐν or ζητεΐν is merely a variety of this difficulty, and particularly of the denial of χίνηπις. The act, of knowledge (έπίβταβΰαή implies a state of the knowing subject (επιστήμονα th>ai)? Q ) Hence learning implies three successive states; first, ignorance; last, knowledge; between them an intermediate state which can only be described as both ignorance and knowledge, just as motion seems to involve successively position of the moving object at the point A, at an adjacent point B, with a third intermediate position or transition (the εξαίφνης ofParmenides 156 D) between them. But further analysis shows that you have to think the body at a given point at any given moment, and that the transition from one point to another disappears altogether. So if you think the passage from ignorance to knowledge, you can find a point at which the subject is ignorant, and another at which he has knowledge, but no transitional period can be thought. Hence you find yourself in this dilemma. If you insist on the continuous identity of the subject, you must assert that he is both άμα&ίις and επιστήμων: but if the principle of contradiction forbids you to make this assertion, then you have to maintain that Κλειινίας άμα&^ς and Κλεινίας επιοτημων are two distinct substances. In neither case is learning possible, for this is defined as the process by which that which before was ignorant and not learned is now learned and not ignorant.
I have elaborated the analysis of this side of the Megarian logic because it appears to me to bear out PrantlV contention that their treatment of the universal was intrinsically nominalistic, and to prove, in the words of Prantl (Geschichte der Logik, i. 37), that the u nimbus of a Megarian theory of Ideas completely disappears."
Comparing together the Megarian ontology and logic, as they have come down to us, we find that they reaffirmed in a new form the Parmenidean principle of the unity and completeness of Being, and carried to yet further lengths the destructive criticism of experience developed by Zeno. The region of experience nowhere shows that unity which is necessary to Being; everywhere it breaks up under analysis into an i n f i n i t y of differents. Time and space are series of discrete elements. The same infinity is disclosed in the being of empirical objects. This being is analysed from the standpoint of predication, a question to which the rise of dialectic had given great prominence. If there is knowledge of sense-objects, it is given, not in the sensations themselves, but in the judgements of existence founded on them 21 ). Predication involves the distinction of the subject (νποχείμενον] and the predicate; what the subject is is developed in a series of propositions. Now when you say that Socrates is young you mean (denote) by "young" the same thing as by "Socrates" but the attributes of a thing are inseparable from it, so that when you assert Socrates to be old you must mean a different thing. Thus the subject breaks up into an infinite series of transient things. You can only think things by an abstraction which is, in the words of Bacon, subtilitati naturae longe impar (N. 0. i. 13). In another way things show their recalcitrancy to the efforts of thought to comprehend them. What Socrates is even at the moment can only be imperfectly developed in a series of propositions, "Socrates is white", "Socrates is musical" etc. (Simplicius, Physics 120.13D); each of these propositions describes Socrates by a different λόγος (formula) "whiteSocrates", "musical-Socrates". Either these λόγοι are complete representations of their objects, or they are not: if they are, then the one Socrates breaks into as many objects as there are propositions necessary to describe him; if they are not, then they are abstractions and false. Nor can the general predicate be saved from the disruption inherent in every empirical unity. The meaning of every general term varies according to the particular case to which it applies; if you attempt to find a common element in these cases you are illegitimately abstracting; judiciously chosen examples show the dualism of thought and its objects; either the general term has one fixed meaning, in which case the eristic syllogism must be valid, or it has not, and all representation of things by thought is inadequate. Thus neither the individual, Socrates, nor the universal "man", "white", has an ο ν σία, because if you try to determine the λόγος ττς οικίας in either case it splits up into an infinity of λόγοι. If the eristic arguments which develop this point can be attributed to the Megarians, they provide conclusive evidence against the correctness of Zeller's view, for this simple reason, that they appear to contradict flatly the το καλόν αεί εοτι χαλόν which is the cornerstone of the Platonic doctrine of Ideas. 22 ) 22 ) I believe that the Megarian nominalism could be independe ;itly established by a line of proof which I have not followed out in this paper. In the early logic predication is regarded as applying a λόγος to a real subject.
The Megarians seem to have inherited the Eleatic view that difference excludes all sameness, a view already controverted in the doctrine of μέ&ε'ξις, which seems to have formed part of the Platonic theory of είδη from the beginning. Under their destructive criticism the world χαταχεχερμάτιόται into an infinity of separate factors, incapable of being united again as the multiplicity of experience was united by the Forms of Plato. The chief instrument by which they effected this κατακερματισμός of empirical reality was the principle &v ol λόγοι, έτεροι, ταντα §τερά εΰτι> χα ι τα ετέρα χεχώρισται αλλήλων (Simplicius, Physics 120.13D). But if difference excludes identity every difference is of equal value: every ideal difference (Hume's "distinction of reason") carries with it a real one: no dividing line can be drawn between essential and accidental differences: all the subtle distinctions on which' the Platonic and Aristotelian theories of knowledge are founded disappear into nothing. The denial of δνναμις seems to apply the same separatist principles to causation, which becomes a series of discrete acts without inner connexion: and the last stage is the fatalism underlying the χνριενων λόγος of Diodorus Cronus.
This subject is always χαλον πράγμα, not το xa7>ov; and when Plato desires to vindicate the distinct being of the universal, he declares that it can stand as subject, and that it is the only subject of which necessary predication is possible, το χαλόν αεί ίΰτν χαλί ν.
